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Article 3

EXECUTIVE SELF-CONTROLS: MADISON'S
OTHER CHECK ON NATIONAL SECURITY
INITIATIVES BY THE EXECUTIVE
PROFESSOR PETER RAVEN-HANSEN*

Thank you. I'm only on page 89 of Marty's two-part article, and that's
just the introduction. Length aside, it is intimidating to come after him
because his opus is brimming with new ideas, especially when, in stark
contrast, I have none to offer you.
Instead, I offer an old idea. James Madison suggested it in Federalist
Papers No. 51 when he said, "If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary."' As he
knew and we know, angels don't govern men (or women), so both controls
are necessary. In a law school-trained preoccupation with the separation of
powers, however, we usually focus on just the external controls supplied by
one branch on the others (or by the media on all three). I'd like to pursue
the other half of Madison's idea and talk instead, for the short time
allocated me, about four very prosaic internal controls. I'll then close by
responding to the objection that the internal controls on many Bush
Administration national security initiatives have failed - an objection we
might call the "Cheney objection."
The first internal control or check is the check of inter-agency process.
By this, I mean nothing more than sending a proposed decision out of an
agency to obtain approval or input from other agencies. Inter-agency
process is common across the government, but particularly common in
matters of national security that fall to an iron triangle of the Defense,
State, and Justice Departments, all of which ordinarily would have to be
consulted on many national security decisions. The details of this internal
check vary, but typically the inter-agency consultation operates at a
relatively unseen and unglamorous level of inter-agency working groups.
Even more prosaically, it can take the highly informal form of circulating
* Peter Raven-Hansen is a Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law at George Washington
University Law School.
I THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
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drafts among agencies for comment. Occasionally, it will operate at a
higher level in principals' committees involving Cabinet-level or subCabinet people and their deputies.
The designation of U.S. citizen enemy combatants may seem an unlikely
example of this check, given the seemingly haphazard way in which alien
enemy combatants have been designated according to press accounts and
the fitful Combatant Status Review Tribunal process. But the former
designation process was described in detail by then-Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales. 2 Judge Gonzales told a Bar Association meeting that the
process begins with a written assessment of intelligence by the CIA and its
recommendation to the Department of Defense about whether a U.S.
citizen should be designated an enemy combatant for purposes of military
detention. The Department of Defense then makes an independent written
assessment, which it forwards with the CIA package to the Attorney
General. The Attorney General solicits a formal legal opinion from the
Office of Legal Counsel, based in part on the materials supplied by the CIA
and Department of Defense. He also gets a factual recommendation from
his Criminal Division. All of these materials are then sent back to the
Secretary of Defense with a recommendation. The Secretary of Defense
assembles this package and the CIA package and sends the whole thing
over to the President with his final recommendation. The White House
Counsel reviews the package, repackages it, and makes his own
recommendation to the President. The President reviews the package (this
is perhaps the least credible part of this account), gets briefed, and then
makes his decision.
Even if, at this remove from 9/11, you are skeptical of Bush
Administration assertions about national security processes, and therefore
doubt the details of this one, I would wager that something like this must
go on. No administration designates U.S. citizens as enemy combatants
with a dartboard, given the dire consequences (military detention and
possibly trial and even execution, without the protections of the ordinary
criminal process).
So what? Exactly how does the inter-agency process serve as a check on
the abuse of power? First, the overlap of interested agency jurisdictions
brings different constituencies of lawyers and other experts into play. They
supply some diversity of viewpoints, even if the involved agencies have no
2 See Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Remarks at the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Law and National Security 11-17 (Feb. 24, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2004/02/gonzales.pdf) (describing decision-making that led to enemy
combatant determinations).
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veto. Although the President calls the final shots, even Presidents desire
consensus, which generates some pressure in the process to accommodate
divergent views. A search for consensus or even more limited agreement,
in turn, empowers dissidents within the agencies because it provides allies,
influence, and cover. The net result is less group think and, in theory,
better decisions.
A second internal check is afforded by intra-agency process, which
presumably works in much the same way and with the same consequences
as the inter-agency process. The circulation of proposed decisions within
the agency also empowers dissidents and harnesses diversity of thinking.
And, if nothing else, it catches errors, or at least increases the odds of
avoiding them. Consider, for example, the reported process for preparing
and submitting an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) for electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). The statute actually doesn't specify any internal
process, other than requiring the Attorney General to sign off on an
application; but the FBI and the Department of Justice have necessarily
created one anyway. Oversimplifying, I understand that an application or
request is made at the field agent level. A supervisor has to sign off on it.
It goes up to the next layer of command. They sign off on it, and they, in
turn, send it over to the National Security Law Section of the FBI or its
successor for approval and to package the application. Then it goes to
independent lawyers at Justice. They sign off on it and then it goes to the
Attorney General for approval, before it is finally submitted to the FISC.
The result is another check on the government's use of FISA,3 indeed, one
that may well be more effective, as a practical matter, in policing illfounded or overbroad applications than the external check of judicial
4
approval by the FISC itself.
Agency culture is another internal check, perhaps the most important, but
at the same time, the most nebulous. I am referring to an institutional self3 As I address below, it is, of course, no check on surveillance conducted outside of FISA, as the
Terrorist Surveillance Program apparently originally was. Even in that program, however, concerns
about the applicability of FISA arose within the Justice Department, ultimately prompting some as yet
unreported modification of the program. See generally U.S Attorney Firings: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter U.S. Attorney Firings), available at
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown-university-law/files/comey.transcript.pdf (testimony of Deputy
Attorney General James Comey).
4 The government's won-lost record at the FISC would match up well with the 2007 New England
Patriots' regular season record. See STEPHEN Dycus, ARTHUR BERNEY, WILLIAM C. BANKS, & PETER
RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 548-49 (4th ed. 2007). But it does not prove the futility of
the FISA authorization requirements, if the discipline of the intra-agency process (driven, no doubt, in
large part by the prospect of FISC review) weeds out most problematical applications before they are
submitted to the FISC.
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awareness, almost an institutional ego about the quality of its products
(decisions, opinions, etc.) and about how its professional personnel differ
from (are better than) everybody else in the Executive Branch. A classic
example with which most of us (lawyers) are familiar is the "officer-of-theCourt" culture of Solicitor General's Office. 5 The Office of the Legal
Adviser to the State Department also has a distinctive culture. 6 The Legal
Adviser is the highest authority in international law. The Adviser is a
representative of international law in the U.S. government - a voice not just
for interpreting but, consistent with U.S. national interests, for advocating
international law. 7 The Office of Legal Counsel [hereinafter "OLC"]
notoriously in the loop in the torture debate and other major national
security initiatives by this Administration, historically had a distinctive
culture, too, to which I will turn shortly.
The bedrock attributes of all these agency cultures is what I would call
the lawyer culture. What is it? Well, we've all in this room been trained in
it, so you can answer this for yourself. But as both a long-time trainer and
long-past trainee, I can attest that the number one principle that we bring
out without fail in every class in every law school in the United States is
competency. It's no accident that the first rule of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct is that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client." 8
A competent lawyer researches thoroughly. She anticipates contrary
arguments. She deals carefully with precedent. She analyzes and advises
objectively. Thus, OLC alumnae declared as first principle that the OLC
provide "accurate and honest appraisals of applicable law." 9 The competent
lawyer looks at the bad precedent, as well as the good, and tells the client
about both. Business clients may hate their lawyers for being "nay-sayers,"

5 See generally PATRICK C. WOHLFARTH, THE TENTH JUSTICE? THE CONSEQUENCES OF
2-3 (2006), available at
POLITICIZATION
IN THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S OFFICE
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/pmla.apa,_researchcitation/l/3/9/3/4/pagesl 39348/p 1393481 .php
(remarking on the obligations of the solicitor general).
6 See Richard B. Bilder, On Being an InternationalLawyer, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 135, 145
(2006) (commenting that government attorneys involved in international law issues "have special
responsibilities that go beyond" their client extending to the U.S. government and American public);
see also ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution, S. REP. No. 100-164, at 65 (1987) (describing the Legal
Adviser's duties and responsibilities).
7 See S. REP. No. 100-164, at 65 ("The Legal Adviser stands alone among lawyers within our
Federal Government. He is the first guardian, and often the last, of the United States Government's
commitment to the rule of law in two different legal systems-constitutional and international.").
8 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2000).
9 Walter E. Dellinger et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 21, 2004),
reprintedin Guidelinesfor the President'sLegal Advisors, 81 IND. L.J. 1345, 1349 (2006).

2009]

EXECUTIVE SELF-CONTROLS

but the opposite of nay-sayer is "yes-man." Nay-saying objectivity is
especially important in the small inner circle of presidential decisionmaking to counter the tendency towards groupthink and a vulnerability to
sycophancy. Finally, a competent lawyer also respects precedent, at least
so far as to explain it away when the client contemplates a departure. In
national security law, where there are fewer relevant judicial precedents,
prior OLC opinions may substitute, and respect for this "precedent"
requires explaining away or distinguishing them. The drag of precedent
may well make legal analysis inherently conservative, but that is just
another way of saying that it serves as an internal check on government
conduct informed by such analysis.
Fourth (and appropriately last because this is really an internal check that
only comes into play when the rest have failed), is the check provided by
threats to "go public" by leaking embarrassing information or publicly
resigning. After 9/11, we have seen a series of leaks of OLC and
Department of Defense legal analyses, and of details of legally
controversial national security initiatives, such as the Terrorist Surveillance
Program and coercive interrogation. While we have had almost no public
protest resignations by senior government officers since the Saturday night
massacre in the Watergate era, the press reported that then-Deputy
Attorney General James Comey and thirty other Justice Department
lawyers successfully threatened to resign in order to get the Terrorist
Surveillance Program changed. 10
But do these kinds of internal checks really work? The internal checks
on Congress of bicameralism and majority voting are both rooted in the
text of the Constitution. The internal checks on the courts of the case and
controversy requirement, the requirement for public trials, and the right to
jury trial are also rooted in the text of the Constitution. But the internal
checks on the Executive of inter-agency and intra-agency processes, office
and lawyer culture, and even "going public" are not rooted in constitutional
text. They are imposed - or, in the case of leaks, regulated - by the
President or his designates. In other words, they are in substantial part
dependent on the very persons they are designed to check. If President
Bush or Vice President Cheney, or their delegates, imposes these checks,
can't they just as easily remove or relax them?
Calling this the Dick Cheney objection is a shorthand for the assumption
that the Vice President, in fact, did remove them or ignore them,
10 See U.S Attorney Firings,supra note 3, at 4 ("The attorney general could almost wallpaper his
office with the resignation letters of those who he was supposed to be supervising.").
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presumably acting with the President's approval. Key national security
decisions were made in a small circle, centered on the Vice President's
office. Jack Goldsmith, who was briefly in charge of Office of Legal
Counsel during the Bush Administration, has asserted that a "War Council"
of just five lawyers made some of the most controversial decisions, largely
ignoring both the interagency process and any kind of thorough and
effective intra-agency process as well."l For example, they excluded even
the National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Collin Powell from
the decision to issue a military order authorizing military detention and trial
by military commission; Powell reportedly first read about the military
order in the newspapers, like the rest of us. 12 Even when they were drafting
that order and allegedly consulted some JAG experts, War Council lawyers
reportedly showed the penultimate draft of the order only to the lead JAG
lawyer, who was allowed to review it for only thirty minutes and was told
"don't copy it or take it from the room." His recommendations were
completely ignored in the final order.13 Similarly, Goldsmith reports that
the senior lawyers in Justice were initially bypassed in the authorization of
the Terrorist Surveillance Program. 14 Indeed, Goldsmith reports that junior
OLC lawyer and War Council member, John Yoo, sometimes even
circumvented his own boss, the Attorney General. 15
Moreover, such by-passing or short-circuiting of the internal check of
inter-agency and intra-agency review was intentional. It reflected a theory
of unitary executive power developed in response to what some would call
an anachronistic view of a weakened and beleaguered presidency, tracing
its roots to the post-Watergate era in which Vice President Cheney served
as Chief of Staff to President Ford (after serving in the Nixon White
House). The ruthless application of the unitary executive theory - in part
by blowing through' 6 contrary laws and internal checks - resulted in what
one scholar calls the "unitary-executive-on-steroids,"1 7 and what the Vice
11 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 22-23 (2007) (describing the War Council's actions as approving the Bush

"administration's aggressive antiterrorism efforts").
12 See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, A Different Understanding With the President,WASH.
POST, June 24, 2007, at AOl (noting Colin Powell's reaction).
13 See id. (remarking on the undermining of the State Department).
14 Information on the authorization of the Terrorist Surveillance Program on file with author.
15 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 24 (commenting on Yoo not "fully running matters by"
Ashcroft).
16 See id. at 79, 181 ("These men felt the same imperatives of responsibility that led Roosevelt and
many other presidents to blow through 'legalistic' restrictions on presidential authority during times of
crisis.").

17 Neal Katyal, Counsel, Legal and Illegal, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 9, 2007, available at

http://www.tnr.com/story-print.html?id=fe4ec25a-8fb0-4fc2-8735-6fd05b4b4b05.
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President's lawyer, Dick Addington, himself described as, "push and push
and push until some larger force makes us stop."18
To rephrase the objection, then, if the President or Vice President can so
easily blow through the internal checks on the Executive Branch that I've
catalogued, how effective are they? Let me offer three brief answers.
First, neither the President nor the Vice President can systematically
bypass such internal checks because neither actually does anything. They
are only "Deciders." The President, after all, is not charged by the
Constitution with executing the law, although we often say that in a sloppy
paraphrase of the actual text. He's charged with "tak[ing] care that the
laws be faithfully executed."1 9 The Decider is inevitably dependent on
others to carry out his decision. He can issue a military order ordering trial
by military commission for enemy combatants, but he must use the JAG
lawyers ultimately to develop the procedures by which the commissions
operate and to operate the commissions. He can order surveillance, but has
to use career lawyers in the Justice Department to implement FISA, or even
to circumvent it to operate the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The result
is that he necessarily is going to run into some of the internal checks I have
described, no matter how bent he is on blowing through them.
Secondly, while the President or Vice President, or their delegates, can
try to change the architecture of decision making, (alter the inter-agency
process), they cannot change the agency or lawyer culture nearly as
quickly. The lawyer culture is implanted in law school and nurtured in
practice, taking years and years to develop. As a result, it also takes years
and years to root it out.
Take the torture memorandum 20 written by John Yoo as an example. It
is now notorious for its alleged role in promoting or justifying coercive
interrogation. But it is also independently problematical to good lawyers
because it arguably violates the first rule of lawyer culture; it is not
competent. It ignores applicable laws and regulations. It fails to cite, let
alone distinguish, the Steel Seizure Case2 1 when discussing an exclusive
Commander-in-Chief power and the power of Congress to legislate on
certain subjects. It ignores substantive due process case law on torture and
police brutality that would have been more pertinent than the Medicare
18 GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 126.

19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
20 Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), availableat http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAE
BB127/02.08.01 .pdf.
21 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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regulations on which it relies. Dean Koh called it "perhaps the most clearly
erroneous legal opinion I have ever read," 22 and he's read a lot, both as an
OLC alumnus himself and as a law professor. Another OLC alumnus says
it is "dangerously flawed advice," "universally condemned," and "an
23
extreme example of poor lawyering."
If you dismiss these criticisms as the views of cheese-eating, lattesipping liberals, consider instead the opinion of a self-proclaimed legal
conservative who served as head of the OLC for the Bush Administration.
Jack Goldsmith looked at the torture memo and decided that he had to
withdraw it. Not because he was uncomfortable exploring the contours of
torture law. Not because torture is repugnant. Not because he rejected the
necessity for enhanced interrogation. He had to withdraw it and a
successor memo because they "were deeply flawed: sloppily reasoned,
overbroad, and incautious in asserting extraordinary constitutional
authorities on behalf of the President." 24 That is, they violated the bedrock
rule of lawyer competency. They also violated the OLC culture.
Goldsmith said, "they lacked the tenor of detachment and caution that
usually characterizes OLC work.. ."25 They were "wildly broader than
26
was necessary to support what was actually being done."

Of course, you could still object that the lawyer culture did not stop their
issuance, let alone any coercive interrogation that they could be read to
authorize. You could say that their withdrawal came too late. You could
say the memos that replaced them were not much better. You could say
Jack Goldsmith is trying to have it both ways. But I think what you'd also
have to say is that, if the damage was done despite the internal checks, it
didn't stay done, thanks, in part, to the same checks.
A final answer to the Cheney objection is that many of the internal
checks are imposed by the Executive in its own self-interest - the interest
of avoiding an external check. The intra-agency FISA procedures which I
summarized are driven by the prospect of FISC disapproval. The
Executive uses the process in part to earn deference from the court. Other
inter-agency and intra-agency procedures are driven by the possibility of
22 Harold Hongju Koh, Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of Int'l Law, Yale
Law School, Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the Nomination of the
Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales as Attorney General of the United States (Jan. 6, 2005) (transcript
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1345&witjid=3938).
23 Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive
Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1565, 1578 (2007).
24 GOLDSMITH, supranote 11, at 10.
25 Id. at 149.
26 Id. at 150.
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due process review. They anticipate procedures that courts might impose.
Internal checks are also put in place and enforced to forestall new
legislation, should Congress eventually examine the initiatives that result.
It gives the President the argument that, "We vetted this carefully and
oversaw it closely, so there is no need for new legislation [that is, a
statutory check]."
In conclusion, there is no gainsaying that the internal checks I have
described may not block a President or Vice President and his inner circle
bent on ordering a legally controversial national security initiative. Internal
checks on the Executive rarely work as roadblocks. But they frequently do
operate as speed bumps or simply as warning flags, slowing such initiatives
until external checks - including, sometimes the power of the press - can
come into play. They deserve the same attention as external checks, after
9/11 more than ever, to serve in place of Madison's angels.

